Social Screening and Cooperation Among Expert Chess Players

This paper studies cooperation and social screening among expert chess players. It employs a large international panel dataset with controls for fixed effects, age, sex, nationality and playing strength where the latter accounts for productivity differences. With a female share below 15 percent both sexes screen women by cooperating more with men, especially professionals. With a female share above 15 percent, women cooperate more with women. Countrymen cooperate more than players of different nationalities, and language and geographic proximity also affect cooperation. The paper gives support to quota-based admission of women and minority groups in intellectually demanding professions.Gender; female share; costs; minority

A Rib Less Makes you Consistent but Impatient: A Gender Comparison of Expert Chess Players

This paper presents empirical findings on gender differences in time preference and time inconsistency which are based on international chess data from 1.5 million expert games. Controls are included for age, nationality and playing strength where the latter accounts for gender differences in productivity. Impatience is measured by considering preferences for different game durations. Inconsistency is measured by exploiting the 40th move time control, where over-consumption of thinking time is inefficient. The results reveal that men are more impatient while women are more time inconsistent. Moreover, the difference in impatience increases with expertise while the difference in inconsistency decreases.Time preference; time inconsistency; impatience; gender

Strategic Behavior across Gender: A Comparison of Female and Male Expert Chess Players

This paper aims to measure differences in risk behavior among expert chess players. The study employs a panel data set on international chess with 1.4 million games recorded over a period of 11 years. The structure of the data set allows us to use individual fixed-effect estimations to control for aspects such as innate ability as well as other characteristics of the players. Most notably, the data contains an objective measure of individual playing strength, the so-called Elo rating. In line with previous research, we find that women are more risk-averse than men. A novel finding is that males choose more aggressive strategies when playing against female opponents even though such strategies reduce their winning probability.culture, gender, competitiveness, risk aversion, mixed-sex competition

Chicken or Checkin'? Rational Learning in Repeated Chess Games

We examine rational learning among expert chess players and how they update their beliefs in repeated games with the same opponent. We present a model that explains how equilibrium play is affected when players change their choice of strategy when receiving additional information from each encounter. We employ a large international panel dataset with controls for risk preferences and playing skills whereby the latter accounts for ability. Although expert chess players are intelligent, productive and equipped with adequate data and specialized computer programs, we find large learning effects. Moreover, as predicted by the model, risk-averse players learn substantially faster.risk aversion, rational learning, beliefs

Beauty Queens and Battling Knights: Risk Taking and Attractiveness in Chess

We explore the relationship between attractiveness and risk taking in chess. We use a large international panel dataset on chess competitions which includes a control for the players' skill in chess. This data is combined with results from a survey on an online labor market where participants were asked to rate the photos of 626 expert chess players according to attractiveness. Our results suggest that male chess players choose significantly riskier strategies when playing against an attractive female opponent, even though this does not improve their performance. Women's strategies are not affected by the attractiveness of the opponent.risk taking, attractiveness, chess, gender differences

Essays on economic behavior, gender and strategic learning

This doctoral thesis consists of four papers. Strategic behavior across gender: A comparison of female and male expert chess players analyzes gender differences in risk behavior in chess. We use a panel data set with 1.4 million games. Most notably, the data contains an objective measure of individual playing skill. We find that women are more risk averse and that men choose riskier strategies when playing against female opponents even though this reduces their winning probability. Gender differences in time preference and inconsistency among expert chess players presents findings on gender differences in time preference and inconsistency in chess. Impatience is estimated by measuring preferences for game durations while inconsistency by exploiting the 40th move time control. The results reveal that men are more impatient while women are more time inconsistent. Moreover, the difference in impatience increases with expertise while the difference in inconsistency decreases. Beauty queens and battling knights: Risk taking and attractiveness in chess explores the relationship between attractiveness and risk taking in chess. We examine whether people use riskier strategies when playing with attractive opponents and whether this affects performance. Our results suggest that male, but not female, chess players choose significantly riskier strategies when playing against an attractive female opponent, although this does not improve their performance. Strategic Learning in Repeated Chess Games, examines if chess players in repeated games with the same opponent, learn about the opponent’s type and adapt future strategies accordingly. It also shows how matching background characteristics affect the choice of strategy. The findings show that chess players learn about the opponent’s type. Players with similar background characteristics coordinate better than players of different gender or nationality but this difference decreases as the players update their beliefs.At the time of doctoral defense, the following papers were unpublished and had a status as follows:Paper 2: Manuscript. Paper 3: Manuscript. Paper 4: Manuscript

Social Screening and Cooperation Among Expert Chess Players

This paper studies cooperation and social screening among expert chess players. It employs a large international panel dataset with controls for fixed effects, age, sex, nationality and playing strength where the latter accounts for productivity differences. With a female share below 15 percent both sexes screen women by cooperating more with men, especially professionals. With a female share above 15 percent, women cooperate more with women. Countrymen cooperate more than players of different nationalities, and language and geographic proximity also affect cooperation. The paper gives support to quota-based admission of women and minority groups in intellectually demanding professions

Masters of our Time : Impatience and Self-Control in High-Level Chess Games

This paper presents empirical findings on gender differences in time preference andinconsistency based on international, high-level chess panel data with a large number ofobservations, including a control for ability. Due to the time constraint in chess, it is possibleto study performance and choices related to time preferences. The results suggest that menplay shorter games on average and pay a higher price to end the game sooner. They alsoperform worse in shorter game compared to women but better in longer games. Furthermore,women perform worse in time pressure (the 40th move time control). The results areconsistent with the interpretation that men are more impatient (with a lower discount factor) but also more inconsistent in the sense that they tend to be too impatient. Women, on the otherhand, are more inconsistent as they tend to over-consume reflection time in the beginning,leading to time pressure late